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Abstract 
Considering various measures of personal income and the evolution of the household size distribution we reveal 
major quantitative inconsistencies in the definition of household inequality.  The changing composition of 
households in the U.S. is the only effect causing the observed increase in Gini coefficient since 1967.  When 
corrected for the actual decrease in the average household size the relevant Gini returns to that of personal 
incomes. The latter has been hovering in a very narrow range between 0.50 and 0.51 since 1974.  
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Introduction 
There are several major agencies reporting various measures of personal income in the USA. 
The Census Bureau (CB) measures personal incomes in household surveys (CPS ASEC) at an 
annual rate (CB, 2006). This measure is called Money Income (MI) and includes a variety of 
personal income sources. The CB provides these estimates to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
also in form of personal/household/family distributions. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) carries out annual estimates of gross personal income (GPI) as based on administrative 
records, censuses, and similar surveys, but it does not provide any income distributions (BEA, 
2012). In that sense the BEA reports only the aggregate income figure and does not allow 
inferring the evolution of personal or household income distribution in time. The most 
important similarities and differences of the CB and BEA measures are discussed in depth in 
(CB, 2012).   The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also measures and reports personal incomes 
filed for tax purposes. Since 1996, the IRS has been publishing detailed tables of personal 
incomes distribution is various income bins (IRS, 2012). This is similar but somewhat different 
from the CB’s reports.   
From the point of view of scientific methodology, different purposes and agencies 
reporting personal incomes make it difficult to follow up the actual evolution of income 
distribution and income inequality in the US in quantitative terms. There is no unique personal 
income definition. Therefore, there is no way to merge all data in one consistent table, to 
estimate the distribution of income over age/race/sex, and to calculate any quantitative measure 
of inequality like the Gini coefficient or the Theil index. We illustrate these difficulties with two 
plots. Figure 1 shows the portion of personal income in nominal GDP as reported by three 
agencies. The BEA reports around 85% of GDP as personal incomes but does not include 
capital gains. The CB and IRS both report only 55% to 62% of the GDP as personal incomes 
while having large differences in income sources.  
Since the BEA provides no population estimates as related to its measures of personal 
income Figure 2 shows two proportions of population with income as defined by the CB and 
IRS. The difference of 30% between these agencies is a dramatic one. In other words, the IRS 
does not count as personal those incomes which 30 per cent of the total population defines as 
money income. These incomes ignored by the IRS are generally small and might produce only a 
small difference in the total personal income.  
One may conclude that the way these three major agencies consider and resolve the 
problem of personal income and income inequality is counterproductive and confusing for any 
quantitative analysis.  This also means that the speculations about income inequality involve 
different and varying without any control portions of the total income and population. Thus, 
these speculations are qualitative because no of the involved quantities are compatible in 
definitions, measuring procedures, and over time. There is an inequality theme, which is full of 
intentionally biased numbers, however. This is the increasing inequality in incomes of 
household and families – the main topic of this study.  
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Figure 1. Portion of personal income in GDP. 
 
Figure 2. Portion of people with personal income in total population. 
 
1. The Census Bureau 
1.1.Personal income inequality 
When discussing the increase in income inequality economists forget those people who have no 
income at all. According to the Census Bureau, there are tens of millions reporting no income 
every year and this number has been really growing since 1990 as Figure 3a shows. Notice also 
the dramatic fall in 1978, which was caused by the largest revision to income definition. More 
than 15,000,000 were added to income gainers in a few seconds. 
a)                                                                     b) 
 
 
Figure 3. The number (a) and the portion (b) of people without income according to the Census Bureau’s 
definition. 
 
The total population has been also growing by approximately 1% per year. Figure 3b 
depicts the ratio of the number of people without income and the total working age population 
(15 years of age and over).  This ratio has been growing since 1990 as well and there was no 
specific acceleration after 2007. It is not clear why these people are excluded by the Census 
Bureau from the reported measure of income inequality in the U.S. – the Gini ratio.  
Figure 4 displays three estimates of the Gini ratio. Black line presents the estimates 
published by the Census Bureau which are obtained for people with income only. Red line 
shows our estimates obtained from personal income distributions (PID) published by the Census 
Bureau. The difference with the official figures between 1998 and 2011 is 0.011. This 
difference is likely related by the fact that we introduced a more accurate approximation of the 
PID in the lower and higher income bins. In any case, this difference is constant and negligible - 
4 
 
one may correct any of the estimates by 0.011 and compensate the gap.  Therefore, we can use 
our method to estimate the Gini ratio and apply it to the PID including those without income.  
When more than 30,000,000 people with zero income are added one should expect a 
dramatic increase in Gini ratio. Essentially, thirteen per cent of working population adds to zero 
income what shifts the Lorenz curve further from the bisecting line. Blue line shows the 
estimates of Gini ratio for the whole working age population.  Unlike the red line, the blue line 
has been rising since 1990. The period after 2007 is characterized by an accelerated growth, 
which is obviously associated with the increasing number of zero-incomers. For people with 
income, the Gini ratio is rock solid over the whole period between 1967 and 2011 (with an 
almost negligible negative trend). Interestingly, there is no sign of the revision to income 
definition in 1977. Despite those 15,000,000 who were added in 1978 likely had negligible 
incomes they did not change the overall personal income distribution. This effect deserves a 
detailed investigation.  
In terms counting, this is a mistake to neglect a substantial part of a closed system when 
calculating aggregate variables. Such aggregates are intrinsically biased and cannot characterize 
the system and its behaviour.   Currently, the personal income inequality in the U.S. is much 
higher than the Census Bureau reports: the Gini ratio is rather 0.58.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Three estimates of Gini ratio as described in the text. 
 
1.2. Income inequality for households  
The Census Bureau measures incomes and reports figures. There is general mood of disaster in 
the growing inequality. Let’s try to dig into raw data and find the reason for the observed 
tendency. Our first point is that the Gini ratio (the most famous measure of inequality) for 
personal incomes reported by the Census Bureau from the very same data set (CPS ASEC 
conducted every March) does not change much since 1994. Figure 4 reproduces the Gini ratio, 
which varies in a relatively narrow range since the 1960s. In Figure 5, we present an exciting 
and sad history for the Gini ratio for households.  We intentionally normalized the ratio to its 
maximum value (0.477 in 2011) in order to show that this inequality measure has risen by 20% 
since 1967. This dramatic increase is interpreted as harm for the US.  
Unlike personal incomes, the household data are collected for entities which can evolve 
in size. (A person always has a unit size.) The Census Bureau does not explicitly reports the 
distribution household sizes and one has to make an own estimate, which is easy, however. 
Figure 6 presents the total household population (different from civil population or residential 
population) and the number of households reported by the CB.  Figure 7 depicts the evolution 
of the average household size since 1967.  Actually, it was quite spectacular: from 3.2 in 1967 
to 2.49 in 2011.  
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Figure 5. The evolution of normalized Gini ratio for households. 
 
 
Figure 6. The evolution of total household population and the number of households (both in thousands) 
 
Does it matter for the income inequality?  The simplest effect is household split - instead 
of one big household one gets two smaller households. The Gini ratio depends of the 
distribution of sizes. The increasing number of households (split) for a given total income 
results in a higher Gini ratio. When all households are split to the smallest possible number of 
persons (one) we have the personal income distribution with larger Gini!   
So, the current fall in the average size indicates that one gets more and more small 
households over time and … the Gini ratio increases accordingly. There is no linear link 
between the average size and the Gini ratio but Figure 8 shows the product of the Gini curve for 
households (Figure 5) and the curve in Figure 7. Now we see a corrected Gini ratio history.  
This corrected Gini ratio is not fully compensated for the household size but tells a different 
story to the educated audience: the Gini for households has not been changing since the 1970s. 
In 1993, there was another dramatic revision to income definition and all series were subject to 
changes. This observed step is artificial.  
Overall, the Gini ratio for households has not been changing as the CB estimate say 
because these estimates do not take into account the change in household size distribution. This 
is a methodological error.  The same logic must be applied to family income distribution - also 
biased.  The mean (and thus median) income estimates also suffer this mistaken procedure.  
Since the size of household has been decreasing the number of households has been growing 
faster than the total household population.  The mean household income must also be corrected 
for the changing size.  Figure 9 shows actual evolution of the mean income (median income is 
harder to recover).   
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Figure 7. The evolution of an average household size. 
 
 
Figure 8. The household Gini ratio corrected for the size of average household. 
 
 
Figure 9. The growth of normalized (household ) mean income and that corrected for the fall in the household 
average size. 
 
  
 
Figure 10. Gini ratio for households of different sizes as reported by the Census Bureau. 
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The importance of the household size correction is supported by the Census Bureau, which 
reports Gini ratio for households of a give size. Figure 10 depicts these CB’s estimates, which 
demonstrate no change at all since 1993, except the one in 2009. (This step is induced by the 
introduction of new bins in the highest income end.)  It is obvious that the change in the 
distribution of income among all households (e.g. the growth in the overall Gini ratio) must be 
proportionally mapped into the growing Gini ratio for all household sizes. Richer households 
should not have any prevailing size. Therefore, the absence of any sign of Gini growth in the 
households of each and every possible size proves the absence of the overall Gini ratio change 
since 1993 (at least). 
 
2. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2013) attracts common attention and 
discusses income distribution between labor and capital. The root concern is related to 
increasing share of capital income, which is also expressed in the growing proportion of total 
income in the top 1% of families. Here we are showing that capital does not eat from the part of 
labor income but converts corporate income into the personal income.  The source of increasing 
income inequality is in the tax law. At the end of the day, US politicians are responsible for the 
increase in the portion of personal income for the richest families. There are no economic forces 
behind the change, which would be much more difficult to overcome.  We have demonstrated 
that the proportion of personal (money) income in the Gross Domestic Product has not been 
changing much since 1947. This is the year when the Bureau of Labor Statistics started to 
measure personal incomes. The source of some kind of virtual increase in income inequality – 
private companies redistribute their income in favor of personal income of their owners. The 
question is – how do they get extra money to redistribute to their private owners? The US tax 
system started to reduce the level of tax for private companies. Primarily, it is made by 
increasing the rate of depreciation, which enterprises are officially permitted to charge for tax 
purposes (usually fixed by law).   
We start with a graph showing the growth in GDP, gross personal income (GPI) 
measured by the BEA and compensation of employees (paid) since 1929. Figure 11 
demonstrates that the level of GPI has been rising faster than that of the GDP (and the 
compensation) since 1979. (The share of GPI in the GDP has been rising since 1979!) The 
difference between the GPI and GDP curves depicted in Figure 12 has a striking kink around 
1979. And this is the start of the current rally in the rich families’ personal income. In other 
words, a new political (taxation is a fully political issue) era started in 1979. We would like to 
stress again the proportion of the compensation of employees in the GDP has not been changing 
since 1929, with a small positive deviation in the end of 1990s and a negative deviation since 
2009.  This observation supports our previous finding that the proportion of personal (money) 
income in the GDP has not been changing. 
So, where the extra money is from? The level of personal income has been actually 
increasing faster than that of the GDP and it should be a looser, which lost its share in the GDP.  
Figure 13 shows two major components of the GPI. The net operating surplus (private) has been 
changing at the same rate as the GDP since 1929, while the proportion of taxes on production 
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and imports has been growing at lower rate since 1980. We have allocated the source of income 
for rich families. They take money from the decreasing taxes. But what is the mechanism of 
money appropriation? Figure 14 demonstrates that the decrease in taxes goes directly into the 
increasing share of consumption of fixed capital. This is the force behind the increasing income 
inequality.  The increasing share of the consumption of fixed capital is successfully converted 
in private money, not in investments!  
 
Figure 11. GDP, GPI, and compensation of employees normalized to their respective levels in 1960. 
 
Figure 12. The difference between the GPI and GDP curves in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. GDP, net operation surplus (private), and taxes (on production and imports) normalized to their 
respective levels in 1960.  
9 
 
 
Figure 14. GDP and consumption of fixed capital normalized to their respective levels in 1960 
 
 
Figure 15. Evolution of national income (NI) and personal income (PI) both normalized to Gross Domestic 
Product. Currently, they are almost identical.   
Piketty projects some further growth in the proportion of capital income. Here we 
present an extremely simple observation which bans any further growth in the capital‘s share of 
income. Figure 15 displays the evolution of national income (NI), i.e. the sum of labor and 
capital income, and personal income (PI), both reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
In the 1970s, the difference was 10% and then stared to decrease. This is the period which 
Piketty highlights as the era of capital income, i.e. all increase in the share of personal income 
was appropriated by capital.  Since 2011, there is no room for further growth in the share of 
capital income – all national income is distributed as personal income. There is no other source 
of income, except may be decrease in the consumption of fixed capital (CFC). There is nothing 
to share any more. 
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